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Engaging with the ‘local turn’ in Post-Conflict States: A Critical Analysis of UN 
Peacebuilding in Côte d’Ivoire and Libya. 
 





The ‘local turn’ in peacebuilding represents a reorientation of the process to 
better integrate local actors in order to promote and facilitate agency and 
national ownership. Institutional capacity building, promotion of liberal 
democratic principles, and engagement with locals largely at the national elite 
level are the key features of the UN’s peacebuilding agenda in post-conflict 
states. This essay is critical of the United Nations’ (UN) engagement with the 
‘local’ in its peacebuilding and development agenda.  Such an approach presents 
a narrow focus on institutional level reforms to promote peacebuilding with a 
limited appreciation of the local context. The essay argues that inherent 
complexities exist among the different local actors based on significant social 
identifiers such as ethnicity and social stratification. It is therefore necessary to 
problematize the tendency for some practitioners and academics in the field of 
peacebuilding to create a homogenized portrayal of local actors and their 
interests in relation to the process of post-conflict reconstruction. The two cases 
of post-conflict states studied for analysis of UN reporting on peacebuilding are 
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Introduction 
 This thesis analyzes the ‘local turn’ in the discourse and practice of 
peacebuilding in post-conflict states. The research presented in this essay is 
shaped by critiques of the dominant ‘liberal peacebuilding paradigm’, and the 
prescription of liberal democratic principles which are sometimes alien to the 
context in which they are applied (Richmond & Mitchell, 2011).  The local turn 
can be seen as a recognition of the challenges of implementing the 
‘Responsibility to Protect’ doctrine (RtoP) in practice, or at the very least a 
subsequent phase in the evolution of discussions surrounding international 
intervention. And yet as this thesis will show, the shift towards the local has been 
largely superficial and rhetorical on the part of international organizations such 
as the United Nations (UN).  
National ownership and the local turn have gained prominence in the 
discourse and agenda of peacebuilding and development in post-conflict 
societies. This trend can be seen in the significant body of critical analysis and 
literature that exists in the academic field as well as the reports and priorities 
of the UN in relation to peacebuilding in the 21st century. An examination of the 
UN’s key focus on Security Sector Reform (SSR), which is “a central component 
of the organization’s peacebuilding and development agenda”, highlights the 
importance placed on local ownership by stakeholders in the reconstruction of 
post-conflict states (United Nations, 2013, par. 63). The Secretary-General’s 
2013 report on SSR makes recommendations which aim to support “security 
sector reform by encouraging inclusive and sustainable national ownership” 
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(United Nations, 2013, par. 64). This points to the salience of investigating the 
local turn in peacebuilding and critiquing the UN’s engagement with the local 
actors in post-conflict states. 
In conducting such an investigation of the local turn, this essay will 
examine the relevant literature in the field of peacebuilding and situate its 
arguments in the critical segment of this literature to problematize the 
generalizations and assumptions of local actors’ homogeneity perpetuated in 
attempts to engage with local populations in post-conflict societies. My argument 
in this thesis will be that these rebuilding efforts will have to involve more local 
ownership of the process and a greater integration by foreign stakeholders of 
local actors’ diversity in order for development projects to attain legitimacy and 
long lasting results. I will argue that the liberal peacebuilding approach is too 
narrow and omits other salient factors beyond the structural deficiencies in 
failing states which lead to domestic conflicts, such as the policy prescriptions 
of external actors like the UN and the human agency of complex and 
heterogeneous local actors (Chandler, 2009; Mac Ginty;2012b). A deeper 
appreciation of the ‘local’ and its inherent complexities is required for the 
creation of viable, resilient solutions in these post-conflict societies.  
The implementation of interventions by foreign actors to de-escalate 
conflicts in many weak and failing states, and subsequent peacebuilding agendas 
and policies have failed in many cases to create stability. According to 
conventional analyses, such instability has allowed these states to become 
breeding sites for the new threats to security, such as terrorism, ocean piracy, 
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and refugee crises, which have spread across the region and the globe. The 
prominent liberal peacebuilding agenda prescribed by the UN advocates liberal 
democratic principles, such as elections and the rule of law, as the general 
antidote to spur positive transformation in post-conflict states. Authors such as 
Julien Barbara (2008) and Roger Mac Ginty (2012a) are critical of the 
effectiveness of such policies to create stable and resilient states in the 
aftermath of conflicts.  My research will engage in a critical analysis of the 
relevant literature to investigate the liberal institutionalist perspective on 
peacebuilding, which contends that conflicts in failing states largely stem from 
weak institutions. The dominant liberal institutionalist framework has been 
ineffective in assisting in the establishment of sustainable political institutions 
after interventions, which has contributed to the fragility of states that are highly 
dependent on foreign actors like the UN and non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) (Barbara, 2008). This reality ‘on the ground’ demands that the gaps 
between the dominant liberal institutionalist framework and the sustainable 
reconstruction approach based on local ownership be filled, to ensure that 
peacebuilding efforts have a greater chance of success.  
The thesis will begin with a discussion of the framework and relevant 
methodology used in the investigation of UN reporting on peacebuilding in post-
conflict societies. This is followed by a review of the significant literature in the 
liberal and critical peacebuilding discourse. The case studies of Libya and Côte 
d’Ivoire as well as UN reporting in both contexts is then analyzed to draw 
attention to the largely rhetorical local turn in peacebuilding. The concluding 
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section then reiterates the importance of a deeper appreciation of the ‘local’ 
and its complexities for durable and sustainable peacebuilding programs. 
 
Theoretical Framework and Methodology. 
This thesis investigates the dominant practice of the ‘liberal peace’ in the 
context of post-conflict societies, and offers a critique of the limitations of such 
an approach for effective post-conflict reconstruction. The term ‘liberal peace’ 
refers to the “dominant Western form of peace-making and peace support” (Mac 
Ginty, 2008, p.139).  The liberal peace project promoted by the UN, and other 
international stakeholders, has come under criticism in recent years from 
academics and practitioners in the field of peacebuilding and intervention 
(Chandler, 2013a; Richmond & Mitchell, 2011; Paffenholz, 2015). Critical 
analyses offered by authors such as David Chandler (2013a) contend that this 
disillusionment with the dominant security and peacebuilding paradigm has led 
to a transformation in approaches towards post-conflict states. This 
transformation seeks to challenge the “traditional agendas of power and placing 
the needs of the individual, not the states, at the centre of security discourses” 
(Chandler, 2012, p.214). Peacebuilding transformation has emerged in recent 
years as a shift towards the local actors and their ownership of the process to 
promote resilience and agency (Richmond & Mitchell, 2011; Paffenholz, 2015; 
Peterson, 2012). 
 Such a turn to the local is a laudable imperative for the peacebuilding 
agenda, however, it is important to also examine and problematize the dominant 
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understanding of the ‘local’ in the discourse and practice. In order to undertake 
such an investigation, this thesis adopts an analysis of the discourse in the field 
of peacebuilding with a specific focus on critical literature and problematizing 
the prominent conceptualization of the ‘local’. This review of the relevant 
literature will be essential in examining the current reconstruction efforts in 
post-conflict societies, and the imperatives of foreign actors in these 
peacebuilding and state building programs. It will be followed by a case-study 
approach to draw attention to the implications and limitations of United Nations-
led efforts in the actual post-conflict states of Libya and Côte d’Ivoire.   
It is important to highlight the current gaps in the ‘liberal peace’ and 
critical peacebuilding discourse in relation to the ‘local’, and how this disconnect 
manifests in the implementation of actual policies and programs. In recent years, 
there has been a significant shift in the discourse on peacebuilding, commonly 
referred to as the ‘local turn’, which contends that local actors should be 
encouraged to ‘own’ and modify the peacebuilding process, which will ensure 
greater legitimacy and durability for reconciliation and rebuilding projects 
(Richmond & Mitchell, 2011). This thesis seeks to problematize the prominent 
understanding of the ‘local’ in the literature and practice within the field.  
My work critiques the tendency of many stakeholders in the peacebuilding 
process to present an analysis of all local actors as overly homogeneous with little 
regard for the differences that may exist based on ethnicity, personal interests, 
social stratification among other local complexities. In order to provide a 
nuanced analysis of the policy priorities and prescriptions promoted by UN-led 
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peacebuilding efforts in my selected studies, I will engage with a select number 
of relevant authors, such as Thania Paffenholz and Mac Ginty, as well as key 
concepts from a niche section of the critical peacebuilding literature. It is 
necessary to interact with these “critiques of the critiques” to better understand 
the limitations of both the liberal and critical discourses on peacebuilding, 
particularly in relation to the integration of local actors in the process of post-
conflict reconstruction and reconciliation (Peterson, 2012, p.9). 
 Mac Ginty’s (2012a) arguments and position on the concepts of 
‘participation’ and ‘non-participation’, in regards to local actors and how the 
progress of the peacebuilding process is measured by international stakeholders, 
are central to the analysis presented in this thesis. Mac Ginty (2012a) argues that 
promoting citizen participation in society is a major feature of the liberal peace 
‘script’, which attempts to solve non-participation by removing barriers to 
improve the accessibility of institutions for local actors. This highlights the 
limitations of the dominant liberal peacebuilding to acknowledge the contextual 
complexities at play in heterogeneous non-Western, post-conflict societies, 
where the norms and social attitudes may in fact differ from those exported by 
the liberal peace. Mac Ginty (2012a) contends that non-participation is, in many 
instances, a form of agency exerted by local actors “that is not directly or 
consciously linked to public political processes” (p.172). Mac Ginty’s arguments 
on these concepts in relation to the liberal peace project will be discussed in 
greater detail later in this thesis. Suffice it to say here that I will utilize these 
arguments about limited focus placed on non-participation in liberal 
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peacebuilding to draw attention to the priorities of the United Nations in post-
conflict states.  
The narratives and reporting of the UN in its mission reports and other key 
documents highlights its preoccupation with visible, and sometimes superficial, 
indicators of progress such as civil society activities, voter registration and 
turnout at elections. This bias towards readily quantifiable forms of participation 
can distort the actual representation of the situation faced by local actors on the 
ground, and the motivations for such actions (Mac Ginty, 2012a). It is necessary 
to evaluate these reports and narratives produced by the UN to determine the 
actual focus of the organization in peacebuilding. I will argue that the focus 
remains on institutional state-level capacity and liberal democratic principles as 
agents of transformation in post-conflict societies. This is a problematic 
approach primarily because it generally fails to appreciate the socio-economic 
context of these states, and disproportionately empowers local elites, who are 
co-opted into the liberal peacebuilding agenda.  
My work engages with its selected case studies by investigating this 
problematic policy priority promoted by the UN, which in many instances benefits 
a privileged class of local elites at the expense of other classes of non-elites in 
society.  Such an approach will highlight how the gaps in the discourse, 
imperatives and policy goals of reconstruction have adversely shaped real-world 
situations. The thesis will adopt a critical study and descriptive lens for analyzing 
and interpreting the results of the research on both case studies and the liberal 
peacebuilding agenda. Such an approach is in line with much of the literature on 
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intervention and peacebuilding, which narrates and explains the debates and 
developments within the field. The critical lens will be applied when interpreting 
the results from the case studies to determine to what extent the UN’s emphasis 
on the ‘local’ translates into substantially different approaches in peacebuilding 
policies and programs as verified by UN reports on Libya and Côte d’Ivoire.  
The choice of Côte d’Ivoire and Libya for the case studies in my thesis is 
based on the contemporary nature of the conflicts and interventions in both 
countries. Furthermore, these cases are significant in terms of the legacy of RtoP 
and its application in the context of UN peacekeeping missions since both 
missions were in part legitimized by claims that UN intervention without the 
consent of the national government was necessary in order to protect civilians 
given the host government’s ‘unwillingness’ to do so (Bellamy & Williams, 2011). 
The legacy of RtoP in Côte d’Ivoire and Libya offers an interesting point of 
evaluation in terms of understanding the evolution of the peacekeeping discourse 
from one anchored in ‘responsibility to protect’ to one increasingly grounded in 
claims of ‘local ownership’. 
While no two interventions are the same, these African countries provide 
points for comparison and contrast on key issues, such as security, ethnic 
differences and struggle for political power among local elites, which sparked 
domestic conflicts among diverse factions. It is important to look at these case 
studies to gain an in-depth understanding of the historical background behind the 
domestic conflicts, and the efforts being implemented to rebuild and promote 
national reconciliation. Such an understanding of the different causes of conflict 
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is crucial in order to prevent a recurrence of violence or a return to a divisive 
and unequal status quo. My research of these case studies primarily aims to 
evaluate the multilateral efforts led by the UN, to rebuild these two post-conflict 
states, and highlight the gaps between the Western prescribed institutional 
framework policies and locally owned strategies which promote agency. 
Côte d’Ivoire as a case study appears to be a model of relatively successful 
rebuilding and national reconciliation after close to a decade of conflict and civil 
war that divided the country (United Nations, 2015). Considerable gains have 
been made, particularly in the political and institutional realm of the state with 
the credible re-election of President Alassane Ouattara for a second and final 
term serving as a major landmark in the peacebuilding process. Multilateral 
efforts to restore stability and security in the country have been coordinated by 
the United Nations Operations in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) since the passing of 
Security Council resolution 1548 in 2004. It will be useful to analyze the efforts 
undertaken by UNOCI to achieve their mandate over the past decade, especially 
with the expected formal withdrawal of the operation from the country in June 
2017. In this context, 2016 was an important year for the “consolidation of the 
political dispensation” and other vital reforms such as SSR needed for a durable 
peacebuilding process in Côte d’Ivoire (United Nations, 2016c). This case study, 
with its relative success, therefore provides an interesting sample for 
investigating the liberal peacebuilding paradigm, and the importance of 
understanding the local context in crafting efficient strategies and frameworks. 
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Libya, the other case study, provides a unique comparison to the Ivorian 
case study, particularly given the presence of ethnic and class heterogeneity in 
both cases. I argue that this heterogeneity, and the complexity that arises from 
such differences, is largely underappreciated in the institutional policy 
prescriptions developed and implemented by international stakeholders with 
assistance from their local elite collaborators. It is also worth noting that the 
security and political landscape in Libya is much more volatile than that in Côte 
d’Ivoire, and remains largely unstable as a result of significant clashes between 
warring factions, and the presence of terrorist groups such as the Islamic State 
of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) (United Nations, 2016a). The key objective and priority 
of international actors in Libya continues to be the successful conclusion of the 
democratic transition process through the Libyan Political Agreement (United 
Nations, 2016b).  
 My research will consist of an investigation of key primary sources such as 
the reports and resolutions authored primarily by the UN with the goal of 
understanding the mandate and policy actions of international missions on the 
ground to facilitate national reconciliation and post-conflict reconstruction.  
These ‘liberal peace narratives’, although biased towards visible indicators of 
progress, provide valuable information on the peacebuilding programs and 
priorities in each case study. It is necessary to examine the language used in the 
UN missions’ reporting of the situation to highlight the gap between the discourse 
and practice of peacebuilding. As a result, the thesis’ analysis of the case studies 
will utilize the relevant literature on critical peacebuilding, particularly the 
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concepts of participation and non-participation to criticize the problematic 
nature of focusing solely on the institutional framework which is a prominent 
aspect of the liberal peacebuilding agenda in post-conflict societies. A review of 
the discourse on peacebuilding and intervention will provide useful insights into 
the role of liberal institutions in state building, and discovering how local agency 
can be promoted in the formulation and implementation of rebuilding strategies.  
The key contribution of my research lies with the analysis of the 
contemporary nature of the discourse and practice of intervention and 
peacebuilding in the field of international relations. This thesis examines current 
trends and the evolution in the discourse since the introduction of RtoP to the 
current debates on integrating local ownership in the peacebuilding research. My 
research identifies the gap in the liberal peacebuilding agenda in relation to its 
overemphasis on institutional variables and programs such as SSR, constitutional 
amendments and electoral reform, with little attention paid to the agency of 
local actors in post-conflict societies. Building on the critiques presented in the 
critical peacebuilding literature, I argue that substantial local ownership of 
peacebuilding is a vital step in creating viable policy solutions. 
This research differentiates itself from many others in the critical 
peacebuilding discourse by focusing on the heterogeneity of local actors based 
on significant social identifiers such as ethnicity and class interests. This 
differentiation serves to draw attention to the need not to create false 
dichotomies and categorizations of the stakeholders and actors in the 
peacebuilding process. The tendency to generalize and create rigid binaries 
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between the ‘international’ and the ‘local’ has plagued not only the liberal peace 
project, but also its critics within the critical liberal peacebuilding discourse 
(Paffenholz, 2015). Such binaries make it difficult to properly appreciate the 
complex power relations and differences of the primary actors in post-conflict 
societies.  
Arguments about the need for a greater appreciation of local 
heterogeneity and complexities from the scholars in the critical peacebuilding 
discourse such as Mac Ginty and Paffenhoz are discussed further in the literature 
review section of this thesis. In engaging with the discourse on the local, it is 
necessary to avoid romanticizing and elevating these actors beyond their actual 
capabilities to the development of viable policy solutions (Abboud, 2017). 
Through an investigation of the UN’s peacebuilding activities in the selected case 
studies, this thesis seeks to criticize the liberal peacebuilding preoccupation with 
institutional-level transformation, as well its interpretation and engagement 
with the local which is narrowly regulated to the elite level.  
 
Literature Review 
This thesis seeks to investigate the shortcomings and limitations of the 
liberal peacebuilding agenda promoted by the UN peacekeeping operations in the 
context of post-conflict states and societies. In order to do this, it is necessary 
to present the relevant schools of thought and changes in the discourse on 
humanitarian intervention and post-conflict reconstruction. This research is 
situated in the critical discourse on peacebuilding in post-conflict states and 
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argues that a more nuanced understanding of the heterogeneous nature of local 
actors is necessary to facilitate viable, resilient solutions. 
This section reviews early discussions on liberal institution-led 
humanitarian intervention in the post- Cold War era and the subsequent shift 
towards hybridised models, which most often claimed to have as their goal 
developing more effective peacebuilding approaches in former conflict areas. 
These hybridised models aim to integrate the local into the peacebuilding agenda 
in post-conflict societies and promote greater local ownership of the process. 
The first phase of the literature that will be examined in this section focuses on 
the human security, humanitarian intervention and RtoP doctrine discourse that 
emerged after the Cold War ended towards the end of the 20th century. This is a 
useful starting point for the literature review because it provides relevant 
knowledge on the changes in the security and intervention discourse particularly 
in relation to the UN peacebuilding agenda in post-conflict states. 
 Human security emerged in the middle of the 1990s and was articulated 
in the United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) Human Development 
Report which articulated the broad conception of ‘freedom from fear’ and 
‘freedom from want’ in relation to security (de Larrinaga & Doucet, 2008; UNDP, 
1994). For some authors, human security was proposed as an alternative security 
paradigm to the dominant focus on national and territorial security. de Larrinaga 
& Doucet (2008) contend that human security was often presented as being built 
upon a foundation of universal human rights and therefore developed “as an 
alternative to the traditional discourse of security- where security is understood 
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in strict military terms…” (p.523). According to the 2001 International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) report, “human 
security means the security of people – their physical safety, their economic and 
social well-being, respect for their dignity and worth as human beings, and the 
protection of their human rights and fundamental freedoms.” (p.15). The 
institutionalization of the new human security discourse is exemplified by the 
prominence of the RtoP doctrine during this period after the Cold War. 
According to many scholars, the end of the Cold War in the early 1990’s 
led to a shift in the balance of power on the international stage. This, in turn, 
had adverse effects in many former satellite states of the superpower states. For 
some, these negative effects have largely manifested in the form of a rapid 
increase in the amount of internal state conflicts and mass atrocities in certain 
parts of the world.  The wars and crimes against humanity within many of these 
states immediately became prominent among the threats being faced by an 
increasing globalized world in the 1990s. Humanitarian disasters and domestic 
conflicts in countries such as Somalia, Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda drew 
attention to the responsibilities that national governments have in relation to 
the security and well-being of their populations (United Nations, 2004). 
 
In the backdrop of mass atrocities and genocides in such states there 
emerged a growing debate for a new intervention framework to be created, most 
notably in the context of ongoing discussions regarding reforms of UN 
peacekeeping operations. The doctrine that emerged from these debates was 
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called the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (RtoP), and it was portrayed as a new way 
of understanding and implementing humanitarian intervention by actors under 
the auspices of the UN and other regional organizations (Evans & Sahnoun, 2002; 
Evans, 2009). Evans and Sahnoun were co-chairs of the Canadian-appointed RtoP 
commission which formulated the doctrine’s ideas and concepts as a response to 
the questions and debates around intervention at the time. Evans describes the 
doctrine as simply turning “the notion of ‘right to intervene’ upside down” (2009, 
p.9). Such a description referred to the doctrine’s emphasis on the collective 
responsibility of actors in the international arena, and not just Western powers, 
to react to atrocities and crimes against humanity.  
The doctrine embodied the alternative ideas towards key concepts such 
as state sovereignty, responsibility and intervention. RtoP was a move away from 
the traditional ‘Westphalian’ understanding of sovereignty as an absolute right 
of the state over the people within its territory. The manner in which states 
treated their populations would now be recognized as a core responsibility 
associated with sovereignty. Ramesh Thakur (2007) describes the modern notion 
of sovereignty as being constrained by the state’s responsibility to serve the 
citizens’ interests and physical well-being. The new understanding of sovereignty 
limits this traditional ‘right’, and then adds the notion of a state’s responsibility 
and duty towards the protection of its population.  
In the report of the Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on Threats, 
Challenges and Change, released in 2004, it was noted that within the 
international community there was a “growing recognition that the issue is…the 
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‘responsibility to protect’ of every State when it comes to people suffering from 
avoidable catastrophe” (United Nations, 2004, par.201). Endorsement for this 
modern iteration of responsibility within the international community can be 
further observed in notable documents such as the 2005 World Summit Outcome 
Document, in which states expressed support for and commitment to the RtoP 
doctrine (United Nations, 2005, par. 138-139). Intervention was also reimagined 
as the collective responsibility of other state actors to protect the population of 
another state, when said state is ‘unwilling’ or is ‘unable’ to effectively do so. 
Such a ‘collective responsibility’ would be geared towards at risk populations in 
states that are unable or unwilling to protect them. 
 RtoP was central in framing the agenda of the international 
community, notably in the context of the UN, when it came to post-Cold War 
discussion on the need for international intervention given the new political 
salience of internal conflicts. While this essay does not focus directly on RtoP, it 
sees the doctrine as a central component of the evolution of the ‘liberal 
peacebuilding paradigm’. Many scholars and supporters of the responsibility to 
protect such as Evans (2009), Sahnoun (2002), and Bellamy (2015) applaud the 
important role that the doctrine has played in the discourse and implementation 
of international intervention over the past decade. It has also been argued that 
the doctrine has become an established UN norm and that, in the long-term, it 
has and will continue to contribute to the changing behaviours by many state 
actors in regards to intervention (Bellamy, 2015). Nevertheless, years after the 
doctrine was introduced there is still a high level of internal conflicts and crimes 
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against humanity in many failed and weak states such as Iraq, Libya and Syria. 
Radical terrorism and escalating refugee crises are considered to be prominent 
examples of the new global security threats in this decade. Furthermore, 
persistent underdevelopment remains a pertinent factor behind continued state 
weakness and resurgent violence (Barbara, 2008). 
Furthermore, critics of this modern iteration of state sovereignty 
questioned the imperative and whether this norm of intervention will be 
deployed “only in weak and weakened states” or in all states without distinction” 
(Traub, 2009, p.74).  Therefore, under the RtoP doctrine, it became necessary 
to define the scope and scale of ‘security’ especially as it related to legitimate 
reasons and imperatives for international interventions. Attempts to make 
normative prescriptions on this issue, and the subsequent course of action to be 
implemented, produced ‘the narrow versus broad’ debate within the field of 
humanitarian intervention. The ‘broad’ position in the discourse seeks to expand 
on the ‘narrow’ interpretation of intervention towards largely military actions to 
safeguard the physical security of individuals in conflict situations. In its 
implementation in conflict situations, RtoP employs a narrow interpretation of 
the broad values promoted in human security by focusing on state-centric 
solutions to insecurity (de Larrinaga & Doucet, 2008). 
 The broad position in the discourse contends that traditional realist 
security frameworks fail to properly represent and analyze the causes of weak 
and failed states, arguing that many other issues “arise outside the realm of 
conventional security analysis” to affect such states (Macarthur, 2008, p.424). 
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This argument that security is no longer solely a military matter marks a shift in 
the discourse on humanitarian intervention beyond just successful military 
actions towards structural and societal rebuilding. The shift in discourse is where 
this thesis’ focus emanates and where the critique of the goals of the liberal 
peacebuilding framework espoused by international institutions in post-conflict 
states is located. 
  Human security helped shape the critical perspective of this thesis in 
regards to the current priorities and imperatives of the liberal institutionalist 
framework. Human security has served as a gateway to engaging with 
interdisciplinary approaches towards intervention and rebuilding in my 
preliminary investigation of the literature. This engagement provided an 
opportunity to better understand the neoliberal and institutional priorities that 
exist in the ‘post-conflict development state’ (Barbara, 2008). The second phase 
of the literature examined in this thesis brings to the foreground these questions 
about the imperatives of ‘liberal interventionism’ and the feasibility of imposing 
core liberal values such as democratic institutions, human rights and equality 
(Lu, 2007; Gheciu & Welsh, 2009; Barbara, 2008). This phase of the literature 
review moves beyond the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention in relation to 
sovereignty and focuses on the long-term effects of such interventions in creating 
peaceful societies. 
 This essay critically engages with the literature that focuses on rethinking 
neoliberal state building in the aftermath of foreign intervention to end conflicts 
and mass atrocities. The critical literature on this issue does not argue against 
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foreign interveners playing a role in the post-conflict reconstruction process, 
rather it problematizes the extent of this role in relation to local actors and the 
unintended negative consequences of employing this liberal institutionalist 
framework. It becomes useful to carefully consider the imperatives of 
interveners and the flaws of the ‘transformation’ rationale applied in the current 
framework. Such considerations come to bear on the analysis of the selected case 
studies as well as the UN’s priorities in those cases.  
 The language of peacebuilding in the ICISS report as it relates to 
development involves plans to “encourage economic growth, the recreation of 
markets and sustainable development” (p.42). Such language and goals are 
problematic in the given context of developing countries emerging from violent 
conflicts, where extensive state intervention in the economy is traditionally the 
norm as well as necessary for stability, in some instances, and as such is directly 
opposed to neoliberal efforts to catalyze private sector investment (Barbara, 
2008). Therefore, it becomes important to ask to what extent such market-based 
neoliberal policies can truly promote ‘sustainable development’ that equitably 
distributes economic and social benefits to all groups in society, not just those 
at the local elite level.  
However, at this juncture it is also necessary to point out a weakness of 
Barbara’s alternative paradigm in respect to applying alternative economic 
models such as the East Asian ‘developmental state model’ in the post-conflict 
context (2008). This developmental state model seeks to “build state capacity to 
intervene in the economy, to guide development, compensating for the failure 
	 23	
of growth led by private sector to materialise in many post-conflict countries” 
(Barbara, 2008, p.307). I will argue that this paradigm shift will only serve to 
perpetuate the failures of previous international attempts at promoting 
development, by overly prioritizing the role of state institutional capacity. 
Proposing a top-down style expansion of “institutional building” to improve the 
capacity of local authorities to effectively cater for their citizens’ needs shows 
an incomplete understanding of the scope of the problems afflicting war-torn 
societies as well as the tendency for ‘elite capture’ in such development 
programs. Such an approach, while necessary and useful, requires 
complementary policy solutions which promote ‘grassroots’ level local ownership 
of the peacebuilding processes that is not as readily co-opted by local elites. 
The importance of critical literature on this issue is that it draws attention 
to liberal peacebuilding’s false equation of a secure and stable neoliberal state 
with peace in post-conflict communities, and that such values and processes can 
be alien to the local context (Richmond & Mitchell, 2011). Authors who offer a 
critical analysis such as Chandler portray the institutionalist perspective of state 
building as a “reflection of the evasion of Western responsibility for others” 
(2009, p.38). Responsibility, under the liberal institutionalist framework, is taken 
away from the consequences of Western and external policy interventions. The 
focus is instead placed on the structural constraints of local institutions such as 
corruption and rigged elections as a means of understanding the causes of 
conflict, along with potential solutions, in weak states (Chandler, 2009). 
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Furthermore, such a position promotes a lesser capacity for local actors’ 
agency to overcome the aforementioned structural constraints by arguing that 
institutional contexts largely determine the outcomes in failing states. The 
liberal institutional approach is problematized in the discourse of post-conflict 
rebuilding by highlighting the dominant framework’s role in undermining national 
ownership and creating so-called ‘protectorate’ states (Chandler,2009; 
MacArthur,2008). This ‘ownership’ dilemma highlights the asymmetric power 
wielded by foreigners and the tendency for interveners to supplant locals, or 
engage just a few elites, in decision-making (Zahar, 2005). Moreover, it signals 
the salience of local ownership in addressing the failures of previous 
international-led attempts at post-conflict reconstruction. This shift in the 
discourse placed a greater emphasis on models and solutions that include 
significant local input. 
 The third phase of the literature relevant to the research question of this 
thesis is found in the discourse on the importance of local ownership and 
‘hybridised’ models in the peacebuilding process (Chandler, 2009; Chandler, 
2013a; Paffenholz, 2015). The salience of the ‘local turn’ as a central point of 
focus in the literature for this research is reinforced by its movement to the 
foreground of contemporary peacebuilding discourse in recent years (Donais, 
2015).  However, I am acutely aware of the tendency of some researchers within 
the critical peacebuilding scholarship to idealize and romanticize the ‘local’ and 
vilify the ‘international’ when discussing the key actors in the peacebuilding 
process (Paffenholz, 2015). Such rigid divisions of the key actors prevent a 
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nuanced understanding of the dynamic in the peacebuilding process, and as such 
I will be critical of attempts to discuss the relevant groups to this discourse in 
binary terms (Paffenholz, 2015; Peterson, 2012).  As a result, this essay will 
critically analyze this ‘local turn’ to present the potentials and limitations of 
adopting such an agenda both in academic research and policy actions in post-
conflict states. This thesis will rely on a significant amount of this discourse to 
conduct an investigation into the rebuilding priorities and strategies of the United 
Nations in Côte d’Ivoire and Libya. Paffenholz’s critical assessment of the local 
turn in peacebuilding will be essential to this thesis’ goal of gaining a “more 
nuanced understanding of the actors involved in peace and state building” (2015, 
p.857). 
 The local turn in peacebuilding is a critical shift away from the foreign 
dominated peacemaking and state building in the liberal institutionalist 
framework (Paffenholz, 2015). This recent turn promotes the agency and role of 
local actors in the process, and its scholars advocate increased local ownership 
(Richmond & Mitchell, 2011). Authors within the current local turn discourse such 
as Mac Ginty and Richmond describe this new paradigm for peacebuilding “as a 
form of resistance against the dominant discourse and practice of the 
international peacebuilding project” (Paffenholz, 2015, p.859). Richmond and 
Mitchell contend that critical peacebuilding and the promotion of local agency 
arose from the ‘gaps’ and ‘loopholes’ created by the formulation and 
implementation of the liberal peacebuilding agenda in post-conflict societies 
(2011, p.328).  The unintended consequences of the liberal agenda include 
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loopholes which benefit a few local elites as opposed to a greater majority of the 
population, while the prioritization of socio-economic development and liberal 
values projection fails to address poverty, ethnic rivalries and other root causes 
of intrastate violence and conflict.  
 To effectively engage with this discourse, it became necessary to examine 
and problematize the different understandings of the ‘local’ that exist in the 
literature. In this regard, Paffenholz’s criticism of the homogenized portrayal of 
the local by some scholars in the discourse is a useful path towards a nuanced 
perspective of power relations between the groups of actors within the local 
context. Local actors are not homogeneous and can therefore either support or 
subvert the peace process within their societies in pursuit of their self-interests. 
According to Paffenholz, there are three levels of local actors in society, 
grassroots level; middle level; and elite level, which should be given equal 
importance in any peace agenda (Paffenholz, 2015, p. 860). In this regard, the 
approach to the local needed to be transformed beyond just the elite level 
towards seeing “people in the setting as resources, not recipients” (Chandler, 
2013b, p.23). I argue that engagement with the local to facilitate feasible and 
resilient peacebuilding solutions requires a greater understanding of the inherent 
complexities among various levels of local actors. 
At this juncture in the literature review, it will be helpful to briefly expand 
on Mac Ginty’s (2012a) critique of the liberal peace transformation rationale in 
relation to the concepts of participation and non-participation to gain a deeper 
insight into the actions of diverse local actors in the post-conflict context. Mac 
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Ginty’s (2012a) article is critical of the manner in which the actions of local 
actors are explained in relation to the liberal peace project, whether in terms of 
compliance or resistance. Such explanations are made possible largely by the 
rigid binaries and generalizations of key actors in the peacebuilding process 
which is problematized by several authors in the critical peacebuilding discourse 
(Mac Ginty, 2008; Paffenholz, 2015; Peterson, 2012). These homogenous 
depictions of the actors involved in the post-conflict context serve particular 
narratives and imperatives, particularly in terms of the policies and priorities of 
the peacebuilding process. Such a binary classification of both local and 
international actors masks the different motivations of the individuals who make 
up these groups by assuming a general convergence of interests within these false 
‘umbrella’ identities (‘the local’ and ‘the international’). These assumptions 
prevent the development of nuanced portrayals of the complexities involved with 
actors in the peacebuilding process, and the alternative policy solutions which 
can feasibly address these obstacles to peace and development . 
 The liberal peace fixation with greater participation can be compared with 
parallel attempts in Western societies to address social issues such as inequality 
and racial discrimination (Mac Ginty, 2012a). These systemic barriers which exist 
in society are treated with superficial institutional changes such as domestic anti-
discrimination legislations. Such strategies attempt to solve these complex socio-
economic issues by making institutions more accessible to the marginalized, 
without a thorough engagement with the core complexities of race, ethnicity, 
and social class that exist in society (Mac Ginty, 2012a). These institutional 
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solutions to such multifaceted societal issues draws attention to the 
preoccupation of the liberal peace project with citizen participation, and the 
failure to sufficiently integrate power relations and the historical context of 
social groups in any given society. The dominant focus of the liberal 
peacebuilding agenda on institutional capacity building and open domestic 
market economies also creates barriers which inherently marginalize groups of 
actors (Mac Ginty, 2012, p. 170).  This focus on the marketization of post-conflict 
state economies should be questioned for the status quo that it maintains and 
the groups which are excluded from gains of the peacebuilding process. 
 The rigidity of the access and opportunities provided by the peacebuilding 
process to the local actors ensures that their agency conforms to the dominant 
norms, with little or no space for those at the grassroots level to adequately 
challenge traditional power relations. It is now necessary to discuss Mac Ginty’s 
(2012a) conceptualization of non-participation and how this has manifested in 
the local populations of this research’s case studies. Mac Ginty refers to non-
participation as “agency that is not directly or consciously linked to the public 
political processes” (2012a, p.172). This thesis avoids the analytical temptation 
of categorizing all manifestations of non-participation under resistance and 
compliance on the part of local actors who are the object of the liberal peace 
project. Instead this concept is used to draw attention to the inherent 
complexities associated in the context of many post-conflict societies, and the 
inadequacies of the liberal institutionalist prescriptions to address these socio-
economic and cultural issues. 
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 The diverse typology of non-participation, which Mac Ginty (2012a) divides 
into broad categories of ‘voluntary’ and ‘involuntary’, further exemplifies the 
different interests and concerns held by the heterogeneous local actors in post-
conflict societies. The voluntary category of ‘uninterested’ individuals highlights 
the primary position of this thesis, which seeks to emphasize the dangers of 
generalizing the local experience. The presence of such uninterested individuals 
points to the everyday life activities that occur in post-conflict societies which 
are not always directly linked to conflict or the existing peacebuilding process. 
Mac Ginty contends that there is a “need to question hegemonic narratives that 
equate conflict-affected contexts with little other than the conflict” (2012a, p. 
175). While further research may indeed need to be carried out in both case 
studies to determine the size of the group of ‘uninterested’ individuals and if 
membership in this category shows a permanent lack of interest in the political 
sphere, it does provide an insight into the nuance required when engaging with 
the local actors in developing viable peacebuilding policies and programs. 
With this understanding that local actors are not merely objects of 
interventions to be acted on and that they have complex responses to prescribed 
policies, this thesis reviews the prescriptions that the critical peacebuilding 
discourse provides to address the failures of the liberal peace agenda. The 
discourse criticizes the traditional focus of liberal peacebuilding efforts on 
increasing institutional capacity at the national level. This institutional focus of 
the liberal peacebuilding agenda is illustrated by the host of programs such as 
SSR, electoral reforms and constitutional amendments which global governance 
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institutions and their national level partners initiate to promote peace and 
stability in post-conflict states. Scholars in the local turn admonish this 
institutional focus on state building and instead promote community-level 
practices which strengthen ‘state-society relations’ in these settings (Donais, 
2015).  
Investigating and evaluating specific cases of the ‘bottom-up’ and hybrid 
models (such as hybrid courts in Sierra Leone and gacca courts in Rwanda) 
proposed as potential alternatives by the dominant discourse in this literature is 
beyond the scope of this thesis; however, it is necessary to explore the potential 
limitations and contradictions that plague the normative understanding of the 
local turn in peacebuilding. This exercise will also allow for a review of the 
critiques of the dominant discourse of post-liberal peacebuilding, and in so doing 
provide a more nuanced conceptualization of ‘the local’ to be adopted in this 
thesis’ analysis of selected case studies. The major criticisms of this discourse 
stem from a “tendency to homogenize practices and impacts of aid and to offer 
only critiques as opposed to alternatives” (Peterson, 2012, p.9). Such criticisms 
challenge researchers in the field to consider the dangers of generalized 
assumptions when engaging with the ‘local’. Paffenholz contends that the main 
problem lies in the assumptions made about the dichotomy between the local 
and the international, which leads to a weaker understanding of the key actors 
in the peacebuilding process (2015, p.862). 
 These criticisms also extend to the concept of ‘hybridity’ which, as an 
alternative to the hegemonic liberal peacebuilding agenda, attempts to create 
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governance structures that merge international technical expertise with local 
values and attempts to generate greater legitimacy in the local context 
(Paffenholz, 2015; Peterson, 2012). Despite the hybridity debate being situated 
within the critical peacebuilding discourse, Paffenholz points to the irony of 
idealizing a concept which integrates the “obsolete liberal peace with local 
structures” (2015, p.863). Moreover, hybridity largely tends to rigidly define the 
two groups (the local and the international) with little regard for the different 
actors and imperatives within these categories (Peterson, 2012). These critiques 
of the categorization of groups under hybridity point to the limited ability of the 
concept as an analytical lens for investigating the merits of a shift towards the 
post-liberal agenda.  
It is necessary to be mindful of the multiplicity of actors involved in this 
process and their capacity for agency and resistance to properly analyze the 
inherent power relations between local-level actors. In this regard, it is in fact 
prudent to consider whether hybridity, as a critical analytical tool, overlooks or 
downplays power relations and the different ways in which segments of the 
target population (‘the local’) interacts with international actors (Peterson, 
2012). Hence another problematic aspect of these critical studies on the local 
turn is the minimal focus placed on contested power relations that exist between 
actors in these hybrid models. These considerations give rise to a similar set of 
critical questions posed to the liberal peacebuilding agenda about which actors 
benefit from these hybrid structures and whether an equitable distribution of 
peace dividends to all segments of the local population happens.  
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 A final critique of hybridity which is relevant to this thesis stems from 
Peterson’s (2012) discussion on the “progress narrative” and “the idea of 
resistance” associated with some of the discourse on the concept as well as its 
practical implications (p.17). This discussion ponders the role that hybridity can 
actually play as a challenge to liberal peacebuilding, particularly when co-opted 
by external actors to frame a narrative suitable to their own interests and gain 
greater legitimacy for their projects. This concern links back to earlier arguments 
in the literature about the evasion of Western responsibility by placing the 
failures of peacebuilding efforts on their local partners (Peterson, 2012). Also 
criticized is the tendency by scholars to frame the concept of ‘resistance’ with 
the international “as the sole object of resistance” (Paffenholz, 2015, p.865). 
Such arguments provide a transformative rationale for the hybrid models that is 
linked to an inadequate conception of the focus of local resistance in many post-
conflict societies. It is important to note that the idea of resistance has an 
extensive literature which considers a range of forms in which resistance is 
manifested within the local context (Mac Ginty, 2012a; Chandler, 2013b; 
Paffenholz, 2015). However, a detailed analysis of this concept and how it affects 
the discourse on critical peacebuilding is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
The review of the relevant body of literature in the field of peacebuilding 
and humanitarian intervention depicts a constant evolution of the ideas and 
discourse which dominate academic and policy debates. With this diversity in 
mind, this essay engages with the current peacebuilding practices investigated 
in the case studies to evaluate the connections between the UN peacebuilding 
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agenda and the dominant academic discourse in the literature. This evaluation 
will incorporate the cautions highlighted in the literature to developed a nuanced 
understanding of key actors and the unit of analysis selected in the thesis’ 
framework. Through investigating the policy actions of UN missions in Libya and 
Côte d’Ivoire and informed by a review of the relevant literature, this thesis will 
now analyze the local turn in UN reporting on the peacebuilding agenda in post-
conflict societies.  
 
Case Studies 
 Keeping in mind that no two interventions are the same, my research will 
evaluate and comparatively analyze the current post-conflict reconstruction 
efforts in Côte d’Ivoire and Libya. Such an approach will provide useful insight 
into the practice of UN peacebuilding, and the mandate and priorities of these 
efforts in the target communities. This thesis seeks to reconcile the dominant 
approach in the peacebuilding literature with the efforts of the UN, which is the 
foremost international stakeholder in the process of humanitarian intervention 
and state building.  
In conducting this investigation, this thesis will rely on Mac Ginty’s (2012a) 
arguments on participation and non-participation in post-conflict societies 
discussed earlier to problematize the priorities of the UN-led peacebuilding 
process and the indicators used to measure progress in both cases. Participation, 
as a tool for the investigation of the cases, possesses significant utility with which 
to critique the preoccupation of the ‘liberal script’ with simplistic notions of 
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transformation (Mac Ginty, 2012a, p.179). To conduct this investigation of UN 
peacebuilding efforts and projects, it was necessary to focus on a tangible set of 
primary documents with which to use the relevant literature to criticize and 
evaluate. These documents included mission mandates, resolutions, and UN 
Secretary-General reports on each case. These documents provide considerable 
information on the situation in these states as well as insights into the 
operational and policy priorities of the UN. 
 However, before going into detail about the criticisms of the liberal 
peacebuilding agenda in the selected case studies, it is important to provide a 
brief overview of the situation in Côte d’Ivoire and Libya. The diversity of 
independent African states like Côte d’Ivoire and Libya necessitates an 
appreciation for the local context and historical legacy of colonialism in socio-
economic and political relations to analyze conflicts as well as effective 
strategies for rebuilding (United Nations, 1998). Hence, this overview will serve 
as a background into an analysis of the success and failures of the liberal 
institutionalist framework in post-conflict reconstruction efforts. It also 
highlights the tensions between local actors which led to conflict in the first 
place and briefly discuss what, if any, substantial attempts have been made to 
address these core issues. Such issues include deep ethnic rivalries, identity 
politics and a general mistrust of local authorities by segments of the population 





After several decades under one-party authoritarian rule of political and 
economic stability, relative to other neighbouring African states, Côte d’Ivoire 
became plagued with internal conflicts and economic downturn (Klaas, 2008). 
Following the death in 1993 of long-time ruler, Felix Houphouet-Boigny, ethnic 
tensions and power struggles to fill the leadership vacuum significantly 
contributed in the descent to a full-blown civil war in 2002, which split the 
country into northern and southern factions along religious and ethnic lines 
(Vines, 2011). Xenophobic and ethnic sentiments came to the foreground of 
clashes between the different groups in society and were prominently highlighted 
by the extremely divisive politics of Ivorite, which when codified into law 
disqualified individuals with non-Ivorian parents from running for political office 
(Political Instability Task Force, 2011). This brand of divisive politics coupled 
with selfish elite interests and a failing economy significantly fuelled the 
disintegration of a relative stable state into “one ridden with ethnic and regional 
divisions” (Klaas, 2008, p.118). The identity politics and tensions associated with 
the legacy of Ivorite continue to threaten current efforts aimed at national 
reconciliation and social cohesion in Côte d’Ivoire (United Nations, 2016c). 
Despite the multilateral efforts of regional and international actors such as the 
African Union (AU) and the UN to negotiate a peace agreement and power-sharing 
transitional government in 2007, the country once again descended into conflict 
with the 2010-2011 post-election violence. 
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 The conflict began as a result of the decision of then incumbent President 
Laurent Gbagbo not to accept the results of the UN-certified free and fair 
elections held in November 2010. According to the results the incumbent 
president had lost to Alassane Ouattara, his main challenger and former prime 
minister. Gbagbo’s decision to ignore these results and hold onto executive 
power garnered widespread condemnation from international observers as well 
as prominent regional actors such as the Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS) and the African Union (AU) (Bassett & Strauss, 2011). Violence 
erupted in 2011 with pro-Ouattara forces in the northern region marching 
towards the commercial capital of Abidjan to overthrow Gbagbo and his now 
illegitimate government. The estimated casualties of this conflict include about 
five hundred dead and over one million people displaced from their homes 
(Political Instability Task Force, 2011). Gbagbo was eventually arrested by pro-
Ouattara forces and French special forces on 11 April 2011, which ended the four-
month post-election conflict in Côte d’Ivoire (Bassett & Strauss, 2011). 
 This overview highlights the core issues such as ethnicity and local elite 
interests which led to conflict in Côte d’Ivoire while drawing attention to the 
inefficacy of interim liberal institutional framework policies of power-sharing 
transitional governments and entrenchment of democratic institutions to 
adequately tackle these root causes of conflict in the local context. I will now 
briefly discuss the UN country mission in Côte d’Ivoire, and current developments 
towards peacebuilding.  
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The United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) was established by 
UN Security Council resolution 1528 in February 2004 for an initial period of 
twelve months to monitor the ceasefire of armed groups and provide support to 
the Ivorian government in the implementation of the peace process (United 
Nations, 2004). The UNOCI mandate was recently updated by Security Council 
resolution 2226 in June 2015 to, among other things, protect civilians and provide 
political support to the Ivorian government as it addresses the root causes of 
conflict (United Nations, 2015).  
 The multilateral efforts coordinated through UNOCI to restore stability 
and security appears to be a model of relatively successful rebuilding and 
national reconciliation after close to a decade of conflict and civil war that 
divided the country (United Nations, 2015). Considerable gains have been made, 
particularly in the political and institutional realm of the state with the credible 
re-election of President Alassane Ouattara for a second and final term serving as 
a prominent milestone in the liberal peacebuilding process. The salience of this 
milestone in the liberal peacebuilding project is highlighted by a recent Secretary 
General report where it is claimed that “the successful conduct of the 
presidential election is the most powerful demonstration of progress made in 
Côte d’Ivoire” (United Nations, 2015, par. 89). I argue later on in this section 
that the dominant focus and priority of the UN in the country is the building up 
of the Ivorian government capacity and legitimacy in order to eventually take 
over from the UNOCI. While such a goal is laudable in establishing a stable 
national government with administrative capabilities, it is necessary to 
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problematize these liberal peace indicators of progress which fail to adequately 
engage with the ‘local’ beyond the elite and institutional level. This 
preoccupation with institutional capacity in the UN mission also brings into 
question how much the ‘local turn’ has affected peacebuilding projects and 
subsequent reporting of results by global governance institutions. 
 
Libya 
 The security and political situation in Libya is considerably more volatile 
than in the context of Côte d’Ivoire. This substantial difference in local context 
between both cases provides a useful comparative platform with which to 
criticize the goals and priorities of the liberal peacebuilding agenda in post-
conflict states. The starting point of the investigation into this case is the Libyan 
crisis of 2011, which was the first civil war that eventually led to the ousting of 
the Gaddafi regime. Years later, the crisis in Libya has deepened “as two rival 
governments compete for legitimacy, control of vital institutions, and 
international support” (Human Rights Watch, 2017). 
The removal of the long-time Libyan leader and dictator by a Western-
supported intervention to protect civilians is a contested issue in the policy field 
of humanitarian intervention (Gazzini, 2011). The motives behind this 
intervention in Libya and questions about whether or not there should have been 
one in the first place is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, it is necessary 
to appreciate the substantial vacuum created by the intervention, the 
exacerbated security concerns and the failures of subsequent attempts to restore 
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political stability in Libya. In this regard, this section briefly discusses the Libyan 
Political Agreement and the challenges faced by the both local and foreign actors 
to implement its key principles. 
The Libyan Political Agreement was signed in Morocco in December 2015 
with the primary goal of creating a consensual government along with capable 
state institutions that would be the vehicle to address the serious challenge of 
peacebuilding and national reconciliation (United Nations, 2015). A major 
proposal of this agreement was the creation of the Government of National 
Accord, a unity government, that has yet to be approved by the House of 
Representatives as regional divisions and polarization continue to be entrenched 
by local elite actors and their supporters (International Crisis Group, 2016). This 
negotiated power-sharing deal has not been fully implemented and threatens to 
further divide groups and stakeholders who are crucial to a cohesive national 
reconciliation process in Libya. The 2016 International Crisis Group report on the 
implementation of the agreement so far points out certain flaws which have 
deterred the peace process. These include the absence of a broader focus on 
security in the state beyond the capital of Tripoli; the contradictions of 
international actors’ policy objectives; and the growth of regionalization in Libya 
(International Crisis Group, 2016). 
Without further expanding on these issues, it becomes necessary for the 
international community to create solutions that engage with all relevant actors 
while paying attention to the needs and concerns of the diverse segments of the 
target population. It is essential to examine the efforts being made by the UN in 
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this regard by focusing on the organization’s mission in Libya. The United Nations 
Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) is an integrated special political mission 
created by UN Security Council resolution 2009, and established in September 
2011 to provide support to national authorities in their efforts to rebuild (United 
Nations, 2011).  However, the volatility of the security situation on the ground 
in Libya has led to the UNSMIL’s international staff being temporarily 
headquartered in Tunis, Tunisia (United Nations, 2016b). Therefore, it is 
necessary to mention that the ongoing conflict and fragile security situation, 
which is worsened by the presence of ISIL, has significantly affected the 
responses selected by UNSMIL to address the issues at the core of conflicts in the 
Libyan context. 
 A recent UN Secretary General report draws attention to the fact that the 
organization’s priority “continues to be to successfully conclude the democratic 
transition process through the implementation of the Libyan Political Agreement 
(United Nations, 2016b, par.77). This report is laden with similar statements 
about the principal focus of UN efforts being geared towards facilitating the 
transitional period and the primary role of the Libyan leaders in such a process. 
The aforementioned difficulties associated with implementing this agreement 
along with the narrow approach adopted by stakeholders in the process presents 
a challenge towards the peacebuilding agenda being promoted in Libya. This 
thesis will now engage with an informed review of key concepts and positions in 
the relevant body of literature with the goal of offering a critical analysis of the 
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peacebuilding efforts promoted the UN in Libya and Côte d’Ivoire with the aim 
of highlighting the gaps between the academic literature and practice. 
 
Measuring ‘Progress’ in the Peacebuilding Process 
 The heterogeneity of local actors in a post-conflict context cannot be 
underestimated or overlooked in attempts to incorporate local ownership into 
the peacebuilding and state building process. Complex power relations exist 
among different social groups at the local level based on social identifiers such 
as ethnicity and class (Paffenholz, 2015). A nuanced analysis of these 
complexities will prevent academics and practitioners in the field from falling 
into the trap of homogenizing, and even romanticizing, the ‘local’. Keeping these 
complexities in mind, this thesis investigates the narratives and reporting of UN 
missions in the selected case studies to evaluate whether there has been a 
significant turn to the local, and which set of actors are being engaged with in 
the peacebuilding project. I will argue that institutional capacity building at the 
state level remains prominent in the peacebuilding priorities of the UN, and that 
its integration of the ‘local’ into the process is largely limited to groups of elites. 
 In order to evaluate the primary sources of this research, I engage with 
the arguments and concepts presented in Mac Ginty’s (2012a) article on 
participation and non-participation in post-conflict societies. The centrality of 
his arguments to the analysis of the UN peacebuilding agenda stems from his 
criticisms of simplistic notions of transformation. The ‘progress narrative’ and 
indicators based largely on citizen participation need to be examined and 
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problematized with an deeper appreciation for the inherent power relations at 
play in the local context (Peterson, 2012). This investigation draws attention to 
the limitations and biases of the liberal peacebuilding reporting and its 
significant indicators of progress in post-conflict societies. It is important for 
stakeholders in the peacebuilding and development process to incorporate these 
complexities and diversity of local experiences into their analysis of the post-
conflict context (Mac Ginty, 2012a). 
 The relevance of participation and non-participation in relation to the 
liberal progress indicators and imperatives is highlighted by the significance of 
both concepts in justifying liberal peace interventions (Mac Ginty, 2012a). It is 
therefore necessary to examine the role that these concepts play in the 
discourses on security, intervention and peacebuilding. The liberal peace 
preoccupation with citizen participation can be seen in the language used in UN 
missions in both Libya and Côte d’Ivoire as measurements for change and 
transformation in different sectors and institutions at the state level. In this 
manner, the liberal peace script’s simplistic notions of transformation are 
presented as “a one-way transition from war to peace, from authoritarianism to 
democracy, from state-centric economy to an open economy […]” (Mac Ginty, 
2012a, p.179). Such a narrow understanding of the transformation process in a 
complex post-conflict society highlights the liberal imperatives of the dominant 
peacebuilding agenda, and its inadequacies to effect change, in many instances, 
beyond the superficial level. Participation as a key indicator of progress for the 
liberal peace project tends to encompass these visibly tangible and superficial 
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level without a nuanced understanding of the context-specific complexities 
which may arise from ethnic or class differences. 
 This essay will now engage with these aforementioned complexities to 
better understand how participation and non-participation is manifested in the 
context of the selected case studies. At this juncture, it is worth noting the 
parallels that exist in both the context of Libya and Côte d’Ivoire regarding 
complex and diverse identities based on ethnicity and class divisions. This thesis 
criticizes the limited role that these heterogeneous identities have played in the 
dominant liberal peacebuilding agenda, and examines how the current priorities 
and policies of the UN fail to adequately address these systemic differences 
which can spark conflict in the not too distant future (International Crisis Group, 
2016).  
 Building on Mac Ginty’s (2012a) observations and arguments on the 
manifestations of non-participation discussed earlier in the thesis, it is useful to 
apply this concept to social issues of ethnicity and class differences (competing 
elite and non-elite interests). In Libya and Côte d’Ivoire, these were underlying 
issues that contributed to the eventual descent into conflict and also threaten 
the success of current peacebuilding efforts (International Crisis Group, 2016; 
United Nations, 2015).  The situation in Côte d’Ivoire revolves around ethnic and 
cultural rivalries which over the past few decades were heightened by local 
elites, politicians and militia leaders to maintain power and pursue their own 
self-interests (Bassett & Strauss, 2011; Klaas, 2008; Political Instability Task 
Force, 2011; Vines, 2011). These divisive identity politics of Ivorite continue to 
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undercut the dividends of the political and social rebuilding efforts at various 
levels of society (United Nations, 2016c). The liberal peacebuilding solution to 
this ethnic discrimination has been largely standardized and institutional by 
facilitating legal amendments to remove the policy of Ivorite from the national 
constitution and electoral laws. Such an approach draws attention to the 
overemphasis on institutional level problem-solving and the tailoring of solutions 
that largely benefit the local elites, which have been previously mentioned as 
the key limitations of the liberal peace project. Therefore, even though codifying 
principles of anti-discrimination and equal opportunity for all citizens in the 
national constitution is commendable, such solutions are constrained and 
inadequately address underlying social sentiments and the marginalization of 
certain ethnic and social groups that occurs during the everyday activities of 
post-conflict societies. 
 The Libyan context also provides an example of these societal divisions 
based on region, social stratification and ethnicity. The Libyan Political 
Agreement which sought to provide a blueprint for creating a power-sharing 
government with institutional capacity is currently in jeopardy of falling apart in 
part because of growing regionalization and conflicts of interests between 
prominent parties (International Crisis Group, 2016). The next section of this 
thesis explores the gap between the UN’s emphasis on the ‘local’ and its liberal 
peacebuilding agenda by analyzing how the organization’s reporting on Côte 
d’Ivoire and Libya amounts to a superficial engagement with local populations. 
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UN Reporting on Case Studies 
 This section of the thesis will present examples of reporting on the 
selected case studies from the UN that will help draw attention to the priorities 
of the liberal peacebuilding agenda in post-conflict societies. Such an exercise 
will highlight instances in the reporting that point to the UN’s overarching focus 
on institutional capacity-building at the state level and promoting liberal 
democratic principles in post-conflict societies. It is necessary to underscore that 
the exercise undertaken in this section of the thesis is not a comprehensive 
evaluation of the entire UN missions in Libya and Côte d’Ivoire, rather this section 
uses the research’s primary sources to shed light on the underappreciation of the 
local and the plurality of actors that exist in the reporting on the mission. The 
language used in these documents provide examples of these simplistic notions 
of transformation and progress narratives problematized by authors such as Mac 
Ginty (2008, 2012a) and Paffenholz (2015) within the critical peacebuilding 
discourse. 
 As indicated earlier, Côte d’Ivoire provides a case of relative success in 
implementing the liberal peacebuilding agenda, and the sustained progress 
exhibited in this case study has led the Secretary-General to conclude that “the 
situation in Côte d’Ivoire no longer poses a threat to peace and stability in the 
region” (United Nations, 2016c, par. 82). Therefore, it will be useful to examine 
the priorities and strategies emphasized here by the UN that created such 
positive results. These prominent priorities and strategies can be observed from 
the language used in UN reports and documents such as Security Council 
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resolution 2226 which applauds “the progress being made in Côte d’Ivoire on the 
path of reconciliation, stability and economic recovery…” (United Nations, 2015, 
p.1). As such, prioritizing institutional capacity building through electoral 
reform; consensual governments and constitutional amendments remains a 
prominent feature in the mission reports and documents regarding peacebuilding 
initiatives in Côte d’Ivoire.  
The focus on the institutional reforms, practices and a limited integration 
of the local in peacebuilding is highlighted in a 2016 UN Secretary-General report 
which characterised the recent re-election of President Alassane Ouattara as “an 
important milestone, whose achievement was attributable not least to the 
acceptance by most stakeholders of the transparency and credibility of the 
election” (United Nations, par. 22). Such a statement shows the focus on 
institutional capacity building at the level of the local elites that the UN’s 
peacebuilding agenda seeks to promote in post-conflict societies. The report 
recognizes the acceptance of the electoral results by ‘stakeholders’ as a 
significant measure for the election’s credibility. I argue that such a narrow focus 
fails to adequately integrate the entire plurality of the local in the consolidation 
of the political process beyond the institutional level. The focus on successfully 
conducting elections largely addresses elite concerns about power-sharing and 
control over resources with limited engagement for non-elite imperatives in 
relation to peacebuilding efforts. 
Furthermore, Mac Ginty’s (2012a) arguments on the liberal peace 
project’s preoccupation with participation as a metric for progress comes to bear 
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in the language used to describe voter turnout in the presidential election. In his 
2015 report, the Secretary-General commends the local population “who have 
demonstrated through their peaceful participation in the democratic process, 
that they have indeed turned the page on a tumultuous chapter in Ivorian history” 
(par.76). Although a credible election with minimal internal conflict in such a 
context is to be applauded, it is important to also consider whether the actors 
at the local level were sufficiently engaged in this process beyond voter 
registration and casting votes. Such a narrow understanding of the local extends 
beyond holding truly credible elections to the underlying social tensions between 
the local actors, that in some instances partly contributed to the initial conflict.  
In the context of Côte d’Ivoire, such tensions arise from disruptive identity 
politics and the presence of a substantial migrant population within the country 
(Political Instability Task Force, 2011; Vines, 2011). The tensions from ethnic and 
religious identity has been exploited by some local elites to consolidate power 
and translated in the contentious politics of Ivorite, which legally disqualified 
individuals with non-Ivorian parents from seeking political office in the country 
(Political Instability Task Force, 2011; United Nations, 2015). The successful re-
election of President Alassane Ouattara was contested by some disgruntled 
sections of the population who challenged the legality of his presidency on the 
grounds of “Ivorite” (United Nations, 2015, par. 78). Such division based on 
ethnic difference signals the difficult task that still lies ahead in the 
peacebuilding and reconciliation process, and the need for context-specific 
priorities and policies which integrate these complexities of the local. 
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 The prominent solutions to these divisive issues advocated in UN 
documents and reports promote inclusive national reconciliation with a largely 
top-down focus. A recent Secretary-General report mentions the need for 
inclusive dialogue on a “shared sense of nation” (United Nations, 2016c, par. 75). 
This political dialogue for national reconciliation is considered to be headed in a 
positive direction because “the full membership of the Ivorian political class 
intends to play an active and constructive role in the electoral processes…” 
(United Nations, 2016c, par. 76). It is important to note that the report observes 
many of the structural obstacles to national reconciliation unique to the Ivorian 
context particularly “with respect to land tenure, nationality and identity” 
(United Nations, 2016c, par. 77).  
Moving beyond the consolidation of the political process, the UN liberal 
peacebuilding agenda also focuses on economic factors in Côte d’Ivoire as key 
indicators of progress and development. The consolidation of an inclusive 
economic growth is periodically referenced in the reporting from country 
missions on the peacebuilding agenda, and can be seen in resolutions passed even 
during the conflict period in Côte d’Ivoire. For instance, Security Council 
resolution 1528 recommends that relevant stakeholders in the international 
community contribute to promoting “economic development in Côte d’Ivoire 
with a view to achieving long-term stability in Côte d’Ivoire and the whole 
subregion” (United Nations, 2004). This points to the limited notions of 
transformation and progress present in the dominant peacebuilding agenda which 
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seeks to consolidate institutional level targets such as economic development as 
the ultimate goal within post-conflict societies. 
 In the post-conflict context, macroeconomic growth is considered as 
“impressive progress” particularly with Côte d’Ivoire now having “the second-
largest economy in West Africa” (United Nations, 2015, par.88). Such growth was 
as a result of “a reformed business environment, the implementation of a public 
investment programme and an increase in household incomes” (United Nations, 
2015, par. 61). This insight into the economic situation in Côte d’Ivoire needs to 
be evaluated in terms of the actors who benefit from the aforementioned 
economic growth, and how that subsequently impacts the underlying local 
tensions in relation to a durable peacebuilding process. I argue that the economic 
and development strategies mentioned in the UN report (2015) signals the 
promotion of economic policies for a developing, post-conflict country which 
largely profits the local elites and international stakeholders involved in the 
process, with little regard for the concerns of other segments of the population. 
(par. 61-64) 
In this regard, the recommended solutions rarely look beyond the state 
government, local elites and the UNOCI as agents capable of creating and 
facilitating viable local-oriented alternatives that can transform a fractured 
post-conflict society. In this context, the root causes of conflict in society cannot 
be adequately addressed with the largely institutional-based solutions offered by 
the UN liberal peacebuilding agenda. With these inadequacies and lack of a full 
appreciation for the plurality of the ‘local’, it becomes necessary to criticize the 
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UN’s commitment to a true ‘national ownership’ of the peacebuilding process in 
Côte d’Ivoire as largely rhetorical and superficial, or at the very least limited to 
the governing elites. This superficial acknowledgement of engaging the local is 
seen in a recent Secretary-General report which urges the UNOCI to continue 
“facilitating nationally owned processes such as reconciliation and social 
cohesion as well as support institutional reforms” (United Nations, 2016c, 
par.50). Despite this commitment by the UN in to national ownership in relevant 
documents and reports, the establishment of feasible peacebuilding programs 
still requires a more nuanced integration of the local that transcends the elite 
level, institutional reforms that are currently promoted in Côte d’Ivoire. 
In evaluating the peacebuilding efforts in Libya, it remains important to 
keep in mind the volatile security situation which hampers UN activities in the 
state. This high level of insecurity is reflected in the mandate of UNSMIL which 
according to Security Council resolution 2291 focuses on, among other things, the 
“support for securing uncontrolled arms and related materiel and countering its 
proliferation; and support to key Libyan institutions” (2016, p.2). The research 
scope of this thesis is constrained to a review of the UN reporting on Libya as it 
pertains to providing support to key political institutions particularly within the 
framework on the Libyan Political Agreement. The tenuous security situation in 
Libya complicates the context in a manner not seen in Côte d’Ivoire however, 
similarities in the language used in reporting peacebuilding activities can still be 
observed. 
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Similar to the Côte d’Ivoire situation, prioritizing consolidation of the 
political process is a central feature of UN liberal peacebuilding efforts in Libya.  
A section of the Secretary- General’s report portrays this focus on the 
institutional capacity building seen in the previous case study by asserting that 
“at its core, the approach of the United Nations family in Libya must be driven 
by the needs and priorities of the Government of National Accord and, as a first 
step, the institutionalization of its authority in Tripoli” (United Nations, 2016b, 
par.89). 
 The prioritizing of institutional capacity building for stability and 
increased security in the country along with the centrality of the Libyan Political 
Agreement to these goals is further highlighted in a UN report where it is stated 
that the organization’s overarching focus is on a transition to democracy 
“through the implementation of the Libyan Political Agreement” (2016b, par. 
77). The report contends that effective consolidation of the nation’s institutions 
and government sectors is needed in order to begin the transformation of Libya 
into “a modern, democratic State anchored in the rule of law and respect for 
human rights” (United Nations, 2016b, par.80). This transformation rationale, 
grounded in the export of liberal principles such as civic participation, is 
problematized by Mac Ginty (2012a) as one-dimensional notion which fails to 
adequately appreciate and engage the with the intricate complexities of the 
local. This rationale fails to take into account the diverse interests being pursued 
by various segments of the local populations, and the considerable consolidation 
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of influence among competing groups such as armed militias wielding illegitimate 
coercive power. 
The UN’s involvement in the political sphere also entails providing 
electoral support for the Libyan High Commission for National Elections by 
“planning activities focused primarily on strengthening the Commission’s 
technical capacities” (United Nations, 2016b, par. 31). These activities were 
aimed at promoting state capacity and knowledge on electoral issues in 
preparation for future elections in the country. Such a priority is in line with the 
dominant peacebuilding agenda on promoting liberal values on democracy; civic 
participation and periodic elections. The provision of support is claimed to be 
based on national priorities which include “economic recovery, including 
strengthening the role of the private sector; inclusive governance at the national 
and local levels…” (United Nations, 2016b, par.60). 
It is important to note at this juncture that challenges to this democratic 
transition exist in the form of “parallel institutions” which attempt “to assert 
authority despite their lack of legal status under the Libyan Political Agreement” 
(United Nations, 2016a, par. 5). The existence of diverse local actors claiming 
authority in regions of the country supports arguments proposed in this thesis 
that the ‘local’ as an entity consists of heterogeneous actors with different 
motivations and interests in relation to post-conflict peacebuilding. These 
diverse claims, in part, make it difficult to properly implement the agreement 
and to establish substantial institutional capacity which is central to the UN 
peacebuilding agenda. 
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These challenges have led to a concerted effort by the UN to engage with 
the local elite actors and leaders, with their claims to authority and coercive 
power, in order to implement the Libyan Political Agreement (International Crisis 
Group, 2016). The limited engagement with the local that is confined mainly to 
the elites is seen in the language of key documents which state that “the task of 
carrying the political process forward must therefore rest primarily with the 
leaders of Libya” (United Nations, 2016b, par.79). Asides from the fact that it is 
currently problematic to properly categorize any one set of actors as the ‘leaders 
of Libya’, this statement draws attention to the top-down and elite level focus 
of UN peacebuilding in relation to facilitating viable solutions to the present 




In the face of escalating domestic conflicts around the world, global 
governance institutions such as the UN, foreign states and other relevant 
stakeholders must reaffirm their commitment to safeguarding human security. 
These actors claim of being truly interested in alleviating the suffering of 
countless people, are called into question when they do not have a credible 
development framework for effectively completing the peacebuilding task in its 
entirety. This thesis has examined the relevant literature on intervention and 
peacebuilding, as well as the UN’s reporting on selected case studies to 
problematize the lack of appreciation for the local in fostering sustainable 
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reconstruction in post-conflict states. A major argument highlighted throughout 
my work is that stakeholders who engage with the ‘local turn’ in peacebuilding 
required a nuanced understanding and portrayal of the local actors.  
Based on an investigation of the selected case studies, this essay contends 
that the turn to the local has been largely superficial in the practice of 
peacebuilding despite the current prominence of the critical peacebuilding 
discourse in the academic literature. Despite the priority placed on national 
ownership in peacebuilding as seen in the language of UN reports and documents, 
the organization fails to sufficiently engage with the plurality of local actors 
involved in the process. The examination of the relevant literature and UN 
documents draws attention to the emphasis placed on institutional capacity 
building and liberal democratic principles with an addition of local elites in the 
liberal peacebuilding process. A major challenge to integrating the local stems 
from the focus on institutional level reforms which largely “reflect the host 
Government’s primary role…” in the peacebuilding process (United Nations, 
2013, p.2). 
It is problematic to continue focusing on largely institutional solutions and 
frameworks to address the complexities inherent in many post-conflict societies. 
These complexities exist in the heterogeneity of local actors based on ethnicity, 
gender, social class and other group identities. Policy solutions which appreciate 
and incorporate this diverse understanding of local actors into the process of 
peacebuilding are required. Scholars and practitioners in the critical 
peacebuilding discourse also need to avoid homogenizing the key actors in these 
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peace projects- the ‘international’ and the ‘local’- which promotes a falsely 
simplistic narrative of the power relations and imperatives (Paffenholz, 2015; 
Peterson, 2012).These complex power relations and differences within the ‘local’ 
need to be further analyzed in order to prescribe and implement feasible policy 
solutions in post-conflict societies such as Libya and Côte d’Ivoire. 
Engaging in an in-depth analysis of the various complexities of the local in 
Côte d’Ivoire and Libya is beyond the scope of this thesis. What was offered in 
this essay remains illustrative rather than comprehensive. However, having been 
informed by a review of the critical peacebuilding literature, I contend that it is 
necessary to underscore the salience of these diverse local factors in future 
research and policy discussions on post-conflict societies.  The heterogeneity and 
complexity of the local warrants more innovative and context-specific toolkits to 
integrate all local actors, not just the elite groups, as the principal subjects in 
the processes of peacebuilding and socio-economic development. Such a task is 
of vital importance, in part, because of the growing threats to global peace and 
security posed by unstable post-conflict states. It is therefore pertinent that 
debates and policy discussions moving forward address the crucial role that 
peacebuilding strategies which effectively integrate the ‘local’ can play in 
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